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Abstract— Obtaining sound inferences over remote networks
via active or passive measurements is difficult. Active mea-
surement campaigns face challenges of load, coverage, and
visibility. Passive measurements require a privileged van-
tage point. Even networks under our own control too of-
ten remain poorly understood and hard to diagnose. As a
step toward the democratization of Internet measurement,
we consider the inferential power possible were the network
to include a constant and predictable stream of dedicated
lightweight measurement traffic. We posit an Internet “heart-
beat,” which nodes periodically send to random destinations,
and show how aggregating heartbeats facilitates introspec-
tion into parts of the network that are today generally ob-
tuse. We explore the design space of an Internet heartbeat,
potential use cases, incentives, and paths to deployment.
1. INTRODUCTION
Much recent effort has gone into developing an under-
standing of the presence and properties of all end hosts on
the Internet using three primary strategies. The first strategy
is active scanning, whereby probes are sent to every IPv4
address and responses are collected [23, 18]. The second
strategy is for providers with large footprints (e.g., Google
or Akamai) to collect information about the client devices
(and their networks) that request service [36, 21]. The fi-
nal strategy is to monitor “background radiation” arriving at
a swath of unused address space (network telescopes) [41,
13, 31]. Each of these strategies is helpful in understanding
the Internet in-the-large, but each also has significant draw-
backs in terms of coverage, feasibility, visibility, and inferen-
tial power. For instance, scanning probes are frequently con-
sidered abusive and blocked, are unlikely to traverse middle-
boxes, and require large amounts of probing, while deriving
an understanding from observing legitimate client requests
requires a massive global footprint, and hence the informa-
tion is concentrated in few hands. Finally, using telescopes
depends on hosts accidentally sending traffic to the unused
address space being monitored.
In this position paper we advocate for a new strategy: an
Internet Heartbeat (IHB). Rather than relying on happenstance—
e.g., a packet arrival at a darknet—or trying to look in from
the outside—e.g., trying to reach each host with a probe—
we explicitly bring all hosts into the measurement process
by calling for them to transmit a continuous, low-rate stream
of messages into the network. This allows endpoints or ob-
servers along the path to expect these messages and, hence,
gain valuable insight into the network.
At a high-level—which we refine below—any node with
a network stack can source and receive IHBs. Participat-
ing hosts periodically send a packet to a random destina-
tion that includes various metadata. Observation points—
anything from a single host to a border router to a backbone
link—can examine these packets to facilitate introspection
into myriad parts of the network, including those that are
today generally not observable and for which there is no lon-
gitudinal data. While simple, we believe that an IHB is a
powerful mechanism that will enable operators, researchers,
and policy-makers to make more informed and complete in-
ferences over the network, as well as support new function-
ality. Further, IHBs can directly benefit users who currently
have only limited insight into their network’s reliability, per-
formance, and availability, and still struggle to distinguish
between network problems originating locally, remotely, or
with their provider. In particular IHBs enable:
• Any observer to have a global view akin to large providers
who make strong inferences from client traffic [36, 21]..
• Common measurements to be made passively—at the
IHB receiver—without issues of completeness, local-
ity, or blocking.
• Continuity, enabling longitudinal measurement, infer-
ences, and learning rather than a myriad of one-off sur-
veys and on-demand measurement campaigns.
• Stronger inferences, that are easier to reason over, than
possible via opportunistic measurements.
• Users to gain insight into their own network’s reliabil-
ity, and performance, while providing diagnostic capa-
bilities, thereby encouraging deployment.
In this position paper, we sketch the design space of an
IHB and consider its potential via candidate use cases, as
well as overhead, feasibility, and deployment issues.
2. RELATED WORK
Significant prior literature focuses on performing passive
measurement inferences. In addition to legitimate traffic,
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non-trivial levels of “background radiation” [41] arrive at
networks due to self-propagating malware, security scanners,
and attacks. Casado et al. show the wealth of information
that can be gleaned passively [9], while Durairajan et al.
leverage NTP server logs to estimate Internet latencies [17].
Dainotti et al. demonstrate how background radiation [31]
provides insight into global outage and censorship events [13].
Finally, Sargent et al. infer network policies from traffic ar-
riving at darknets [37]. While such opportunistic measure-
ment is powerful, analysis and inference is complicated by
the vagaries of attacks, the spread and mitigation of malware,
and what networks are affected. In addition to generalizing
opportunistic measurement, we show that periodic IHBs per-
mit stronger probabilistic inferences.
Individual networks frequently perform regular pair-wise
measurements between nodes or networks under their con-
trol, e.g., Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) that run
continual measurements to detect and route around path prob-
lems [33]. The IHB seeks to push such functionality deeper
into the network stack such that all networks are empow-
ered with such knowledge without having to implement their
own application-layer protocols and measurements. As im-
portantly, the IHB disseminates global knowledge about the
Internet, rather than focusing on an individual network.
Related in spirit to our heartbeats are BGP beacons [29].
BGP beacons are periodic announcements and withdrawals
of specific prefixes for the explicit purpose of measuring and
understanding real-world BGP behavior and dynamics. BGP
beacons have served as enablers of important research efforts
to understand and improve routing, e.g., [40]. In a similar
fashion, our hope is that the IHB enables new measurements
and insights into the global Internet.
Finally, we note that many distributed systems employ the
“heartbeat” notion—i.e., a periodic signal to assert liveness [35,
25, 4, 39] and achieve reliability. A key motivation for heart-
beats is that a node cannot rely on naturally occurring, event-
driven protocol messages to ascertain another node’s health
as silent failures or system changes cannot be detected [26].
Our work extends the heartbeat notion to the Internet.
3. IHB DESIGN
As early-stage work, we elect to explore various design
alternatives. In general, we follow designs that use exist-
ing protocols, are incrementally deployable (today), permit
probabilistic inference, and minimize the security burden.
3.1 Transport Protocol
Choosing which transport protocol IHBs should use in-
volves a complex set of tradeoffs. A new transport proto-
col number would cleanly enable IHBs over IP, but would
likely cause IHBs to be discarded or treated differently by
today’s network [14]. Similarly, adding IHBs as an IP option
is not feasible due to network ossification [22]. While using
UDP or TCP for IHBs more closely mimics application traf-
fic, it also brings increased scrutiny from middleboxes and
the possibility of unwanted manipulation [14]. While ICMP
is a well-established diagnostic and error reporting protocol,
networks may treat ICMPs differently than transports—like
UDP or TCP—that applications often use.
In our mock IHB implementation, we use ICMP with a
new ICMP type, but plan to experiment with other transports.
Our primary design criterion is to design the IHBs such that
they are readily and cheaply detectable, and therefore easy
to block or capture regardless of transport protocol.
3.2 Meta-Information
A heartbeat without any payload demonstrates reachabil-
ity and liveness from the source to the observation point.
However, including additional meta-data aids interpretation
and expands the possible inferences that can be drawn from
IHB arrivals. Here we describe four candidate pieces of IHB
meta-data1.
Heart Rate: We include the rate at which the host is sourc-
ing IHBs and information about how destination addresses
are chosen (see § 3.3). While an observer may be able to
infer the sending rate of each IHB host, the period between
heartbeats is expected to be long enough—see next section—
that this may be a long and error-prone process, and espe-
cially brittle during failures or outages. Further, senders may
wish to adapt the rate at which they inject heartbeats dynam-
ically, and on short time scales. By explicitly including the
IHB sending rate we can allow observers to set expectations
appropriately and stake inferences around the actual rate in-
stead of an estimated rate.
HostID: A well-known facet of the modern Internet is that
IP addresses serve as poor host identifiers—due to network
address translation (NAT), middleboxes, IPv6 privacy ad-
dresses, and aliases. Therefore, we adopt the notion of a
“HostID” from Allman et al. [2] and include a small (e.g.,
16-bit) identifier in each heartbeat payload. The HostID is
randomly generated by the source of the IHB and can be
changed over time2. A host identifier raises immediate se-
curity and privacy concerns. As observed in [2], these issues
can be mitigated by using a HostID that is purposefully small
such that identifier collisions are common. This means the
HostID is meaningless in a global sense, but must be coupled
with the IP address to draw inferences about a host’s behav-
ior. For instance, the HostID permits an approximation of
the number of hosts behind a NAT.
Originating TTL: Including the TTL with which the heart-
beat was sent removes ambiguity of scope and allows both
the recipient and observers along the path to determine how
far the heartbeat has traveled. We utilize TTL values to infer
path changes in §4.3.
Timestamp: The timestamp permits one-way latency ap-
proximation when the source and observer’s clocks are syn-
chronized, but further allows observers to note latency changes
over time even without synchronization.
1IHBs will be extensible to accommodate new functionality.
2The meta-data could include time since the HostID changed.
3.3 Heartbeat Destination
The intuitive notion is that IHBs should be transmitted
around the network uniformly at random. We consider two
aspects of choosing the destination: (i) the pool of addresses
from which to choose; and (ii) the order of using the ad-
dresses in the pool. Here we consider three pools:
Entire Address Space: This pool consists of all 232 IPv4
addresses. In this case, the goal is for all hosts to exchange
IHBs with all other hosts on the network. Assuming one
host per IP address and full address usage, this goal requires
264 IHBs. Note, however, that the number of IHBs required
for full coverage decreases in proportion to the size of the
observation point lens, e.g., as discussed in detail in §5.1, a
large darknet (monitoring /8 of IPv4 address space) can ex-
pect to receive a heartbeat from an arbitrary host after every
28
2 = 128 heartbeats it sends.
All /24 Networks: This pool consists of all 224 IPv4 /24
network blocks. This strategy leverages the fact that a /24
address block is the smallest block that can be confidently
routed across the Internet. Therefore, IHBs to multiple hosts
within a /24 largely share fate. While this is not always
true—e.g., end host firewall configurations can vary across
hosts within a /24—the relaxed goal results in 248 IHBs to
satisfy the goal—or, 164K -th of the number needed for all
hosts to exchange IHBs. Another benefit of using a /24 pool
is that all IHB hosts within a /24 could cooperate to meet the
goal. For instance, if 32 hosts within a /24 send IHBs then
each would have to send 524K ( 2
24
219 ) messages to cover the
remote /24 address blocks.
Local Subnet: This pool consists of the host’s local net-
work, and would be used as a Local Heartbeat (LHB). For
instance, a typical home network using the private 192.168.0.0/24
subnet would have 255 different LHB target addresses, while
the home network’s public gateway (connected to the provider)
might be part of a /22 subnet and, hence, have 1024 LHB tar-
gets. In general, LHBs would be sent with a restrictive TTL
and be used for local debugging and diagnostics. A refine-
ment of the LHB idea is to make the TTL inversely propor-
tional number of matching most significant bits between the
source and the randomly chosen target.
Next, we consider the order in which hosts are probed:
Pure Random: Choosing an entirely random destination
from the pool is simple to implement, ensures uniform cov-
erage in time and space, and facilitates inferences with con-
fidence bounds.3
Random Permutation: Rather than choosing addresses at
random, the sender could instead randomly permute the en-
tire pool. The random permutation ensures that every des-
tination is used before any destination is repeated. Addi-
tionally, the sequence can deterministically repeat once the
host has sent to every address, thereby adding additional pre-
dictability to the potential inferences.
The above discussion is in terms of IPv4 address space.
3With /24 pools, a /24 is chosen at random and then we indepen-
dently choose the low order octet of the address at random.
Sending IHBs over IPv6 networks will require understanding
the general usage of address blocks (as discussed in [11]),
understanding which blocks of IPv6 addresses are routed or
having some form of carefully curated hit-list. We discuss
possibilities for IPv6 heartbeats in §5.4.
3.4 Source Address
Many Internet-connected devices have multiple interfaces,
e.g., WiFi and cellular, while routers have more than one in-
terface by definition. We explicitly envision routers partici-
pating in the IHB via their control plane network stack. To
expose these interfaces, and the paths they utilize, the IHB
should effectively run independent instances of the heartbeat
protocol on each physical or virtual interface, and use the in-
terface’s assigned IP address as the heartbeat source. How-
ever, the IHB meta-data, in particular the HostID, should be
consistent among interfaces.
3.5 Rate
The rate at which a device sources IHBs is a local policy
decision and is explicitly included within the heartbeat meta-
data so that observers can form concrete expectations over
when the next heartbeat should arrive. A possible enhance-
ment to this strategy is to source two back-to-back heartbeats
for each destination. While doing so doubles the data rate—
or halves the number of IHB recipients per time unit—it en-
ables basic packet-pair dispersion techniques for e.g., esti-
mating path capacity [16].
3.6 Integrity
As a connectionless protocol, the IHB as specified is triv-
ially spoofed. An adversary could source heartbeats with a
spoofed source IP address in order to pollute inferences, for
instance to make it appear as though a network is up when it
is, in fact, suffering an outage. While ingress filtering [20]
can mitigate the ability to spoof in some cases, its deploy-
ment is not ubiquitous and spoofing remains a present con-
cern [7]. However, an observation point that receives con-
flicting heartbeat information (arrival rate, TTL, or HostID)
from a given source or network can infer that some of the
IHBs are illegitimate (and should be ignored).
Even stronger forms of integrity protection may be feasi-
ble. For instance, while we do not wish to depend on pub-
lic key cryptography (for reasons of speed and PKI deploy-
ment obstacles), we could utilize heartbeats themselves to
distribute shared secrets. Here, heartbeats would include a
per-target or per-/24 random key in the meta-data. When
subsequently sourcing heartbeats, the host would include a
keyed integrity check (such as an HMAC) using the previ-
ously received key. In this fashion, an adversary can still
spoof heartbeats, but cannot do so undetected unless she has
access to the heartbeats arriving at the remote network. Al-
ternatively, IHBs may include chained integrity using ephemeral
secrets, where the integrity key to the i’th IHB is contained
in the i + 1’th heartbeat. We plan to explore options for
heartbeat integrity more completely in future work.
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Figure 1: Inbound and outbound IHBs enable users
to better diagnose problems and localize their origin,
while facilitating longitudinal measurements of their
provider’s availability and reliability.
4. USE CASES
To shed light on potential inferences possible with an IHB,
we explore three use-cases: outage detection, residential broad-
band debugging, and forwarding path changes.
4.1 Outage Detection
An increasingly important global measurement task is iden-
tifying Internet outages. Traditional methods of outage de-
tection rely on passively monitoring BGP [15] or performing
large-scale active measurements [34]. Unfortunately, many
outage events do not present as BGP activity, while active
measurements require significant and continual probing. In
contrast, an IHB inherently provides a means for understand-
ing the data-plane reachability of remote networks simply by
making inferences over the sequence of heartbeats received.
Naturally, different vantage points will be able to make
stronger, and faster, inferences than others. For example,
consider again a /8 darknet where we wish to monitor the
reachability of a remote /24 subnet. Assume that only a sin-
gle host on the remote /24 participates in the IHB at a rate of
1 pps. Thus, every second there is a 128 probability that the
node sends a heartbeat to a destination in the /8 monitored by
the darknet. After k seconds the the probability that the /8 re-
ceives no heartbeats from this host is:
(
1− 128
)k
. Thus, the
probability that the remote /24 is reachable even though the
darknet has received no heartbeats after k = 100 seconds is
approximately 67%. However, the likelihood of not receiv-
ing a heartbeat by chance rapidly decreases over time: there
is only a 3% chance that the /24 is reachable after receiving
no heartbeats for 15 minutes.
Of course, more hosts participating in the IHB on the re-
mote /24 increase the outage sensitivity and confidence, while
smaller darknets decrease detection ability. The rough num-
bers in the preceding example are meant to highlight what
is possible given realistic assumptions over IHB adoption
and the size of today’s darknets. The key point is that the
periodic behavior of IHBs permits reliable probabilistic in-
ference where conscious engineering tradeoffs can be made
given the required detection sensitivity.
4.2 Residential Broadband
We want IHBs to benefit not just researchers and opera-
tors, but also the hosts and—most importantly—users who
participate in the sourcing and receiving of heartbeats. As an
example of aligning IHBs with user incentives, we consider
IHB use within residential networks.
While there has been significant recent effort toward un-
derstanding residential broadband speed and performance [5,
28], less is known about the reliability of these networks.
This is particularly true for broadband customers who: (i)
will only notice network failures if they occur when the user
is home and trying to use the network; (ii) do not main-
tain long-term statistics over their connection’s reliability or
provider’s availability; and (iii)) cannot distinguish between
a network failure within their home, in the access network, or
occurring remotely (i.e., outside of the control of the provider).
IHBs provide a means to enable continuous monitoring of
a customer’s home access network, while introspection of
IHBs facilitate diagnostics and the ability to measure adher-
ence to service level agreements.
Assume that a broadband user’s home CPE gateway in-
spects both inbound and outbound heartbeats and further com-
putes statistics and metrics over the heartbeats for the user.
In Figure 1, inbound IHBs and LHBs arrive at the customer’s
CPE (in §5.1, we explore the expected rate of incoming heartbeats—
the salient feature here is that a constant stream of heart-
beats arrive at the CPE). Further, the CPE observes outbound
heartbeats sent by host(s) on the user’s local network (ei-
ther IHBs or LHBs). These outbound heartbeats provide ev-
idence that the user’s clients are able to obtain an address and
reach the gateway.
The heartbeats immediately provide valuable information
to the CPE, which can be exposed to the user (e.g., through
a user-friendly web interface). Employing the same proba-
bilistic methods as for outage detection (§4.1), the CPE can
thus aid in isolating whether reachability issues are local, on
the user’s access connection, within the user’s provider, or
remote. We further envision the CPE providing information
to the user over: (i) the reliability of the connection to her
provider; (ii) evidence of which networks could reach the
user at a given point in time; and (iii) evolution of latencies
from particular hosts and networks.
These inferences can be further strengthened by obtaining
additional evidence from other hosts on the same subnetwork
through LHBs if these LHBs work to distribute knowledge
about IHBs received among all hosts on the subnet.
4.3 Path changes
Heartbeats can reveal both global and specific forwarding
dynamics within the network via simple analysis of the IP
time-to-live (TTL). Because routers decrement the TTL be-
fore forwarding the packet, the TTL provides an approxima-
tion of the number of hops from the source to the observa-
tion point. TTL changes for the same source or network are
thus indicative of routing changes or load-balancing, allow-
ing heartbeats to serve as a path change detection mecha-
nism. Importantly, aggregation and correlation of heartbeats
can identify networks that share paths and share fate.
As an expository example, we sent heartbeats from 26
Planetlab nodes [10] toward random addresses of a darknet
over a six day period. While the TTL of received heartbeats
from 16 of the nodes remained constant over the collection
period, the TTL changed for 10 of the sources. Heartbeats
from three of the ten planetlab sources had an equal distribu-
tion of TTL values, revealing the presence of load-balanced
paths. A time-correlated heartbeat TTL change was observed
among three of the sources and lasted for approximately one
hour. Because this path change did not affect all heartbeats,
the routing change was distant to the telescope. However, the
correlated change suggests that the three nodes share a path
in the network core, and illustrates the potential inferential
power of tomography techniques [15] combined with IHBs.
Last, path changes can serve as a rough indicator of po-
tentially malicious traffic. While IP source address spoofing
[7] allows an attacker to impersonate an address, the attacker
cannot set her packet’s initial TTL such that she is topologi-
cally closer than the number of router hops. As such, pack-
ets that arrive with a TTL less than previously observed from
that network may be due to a routing change, or may indicate
spoofing. If heartbeat packets arrive from a host with one
TTL while TCP SYN packets or DNS packets arrive with a
different TTL, this further suggests the presence of spoofing.
4.4 Additional applications
The preceding use cases highlight possible applications of
IHBs; we believe they can enable other uses including:
Traffic optimization: A well-known property of Internet
routing is that alternative paths and indirection can provide
superior end-to-end performance [3]. CDNs and service providers
therefore routinely perform measurements to inform their
path selection [33]. IHBs expose information (loss, capac-
ity) to receivers about available paths and their performance.
We envision network overlays (e.g., DHTs, peer-to-peer, and
Tor) using IHBs to inform their overlay construction without
the need for dedicated active probing.
Census: Network census campaigns, e.g., [23], have seen
significant interest in applications ranging from vulnerability
analysis [18] to hitlist generation [19] to estimating address
space usage [12]. Whereas these existing techniques require
significant active probing (where load is concentrated at the
probing host) and suffer from completeness and coverage is-
sues, an IHB naturally facilitates these studies in a highly
distributed and continual fashion.
Alias resolution: In §3.4, we note that devices with multi-
ple interfaces should run an IHB instance on each. Because
the HostID is tied to the host rather than the interface, we
imagine the ability to perform probabilistic alias resolution,
the process of identifying the set of IP addresses belonging
to a single physical device such as a router [27]. Whereas
alias resolution is today an expensive, time-consuming, in-
complete, and error-prone task [27], a passive heartbeat ob-
servation point can easily identify candidate aliases by clus-
tering source addresses of heartbeats with the same HostID.
Naturally, this set of candidate aliases will initially be very
large—due to the small HostID identifier space—but can be
refined over time as stacks choose new random HostIDs or
can be combined with other information such as traceroute
data to detect aliases.
Policy inference: Work on understanding differential traf-
fic treatment or blocking frequently uses multiple vantage
points to compare results [8]. Similarly, comparing IHBs
that arrive at different collection points can shed light into
different network policies4. For instance, if we observe IHB
packets arriving from source network S at destination net-
work X , but no IHB packets arriving from S to network
Y , then something is blocking traffic from S to Y . Using
additional IHBs and network tomography [15] may further
isolate network policy.
5. DISCUSSION
Although the IHB is largely a thought experiment at this
time, we discuss practical deployment issues next.
5.1 Overhead
To demonstrate the back-of-the-envelope feasibility of IHBs
with respect to overhead, we consider the magnitude of IHB
traffic using reasonable assumptions over the expected num-
ber of participants, data rate, and receiver size.
Let the IHB observation point monitor a prefix with mask
m (i.e., for a single IPv4 host m = 32). The probability of a
single IHB participant sending a heartbeat that arrives at this
observation point is then: p = 12m .
Assume that there are n hosts participating in IHB and
sending IHB packets. For simplicity, assume that each host
sends a single IHB in each epoch, i.e., they all send at the
same rate. Then, the expected number of IHB packets arriv-
ing at the observation point in a single epoch is: n2m .
Next, assume that each source sends heartbeats to random
destinations at a rate of r packets per second. Then, the ex-
pected arrival rate of IHB packets is: a = nr2m .
Assume that one-quarter of the IPv4 Internet addresses
participate in IHB, i.e., n = 232−2.5 If we further assume
a relatively low per-host IHB rate of r = 18pps, we can esti-
mate the expected traffic load on the observation point due to
heartbeat traffic. For instance, at the two extremes of a single
end host versus a network telescope:
• End-host (m = 32): a = 2−3(230)232 = 132pps
• Telescope (m = 8): a = 2−3(230)28 = 219 ' 500kpps
Thus, given relatively conservative assumptions over IHB
deployment, we observe that a single host receives a negligi-
ble rate of heartbeat traffic, while a large aggregation point
such as a /8 telescope receives a technically realistic and rea-
sonable half-million IHB packets per second.
5.2 Security and Privacy
A consequence of increasing the visibility of hosts on the
network is the potential for this information to be used in un-
4Here, the choice of transport protocol (§3.1) is important so that
heartbeats are classified in the same way as normal traffic.
5With NATs this is 0.25 of devices connecting to the Internet.
scrupulous ways. For instance, a heartbeat provides an ex-
plicit indication of a remote node’s liveness at a given instant
in time, thereby providing attackers a potential target. We
argue, however, that heartbeats do not enable a new attack
vector, as adversaries are already capable of high-rate, ex-
haustive vulnerability scanning [18] and make extensive use
of available hitlists [19, 30]. In practice, protecting end hosts
from attacks is an issue orthogonal to liveness. Nonetheless,
networks that wish to remain outwardly “dark” can easily
maintain this particular security posture as IHB packets are
designed to be easily identified so that their transmission and
reception can be blocked as required.
Finally, heartbeats raise potential concerns over tracking
and privacy. We first note that heartbeats are designed to il-
luminate the network, and there is no identifier that persists
across networks (as might be required to facilitate tracking).
And because heartbeats are periodic, they provide no explicit
indication of user or host activity. While it may be possi-
ble to discern when a particular host is powered on or off,
this information is again readily available via other methods,
e.g., [38]. Indeed, web cookies, software updates, and other
chatty protocols leak significantly more private information
than IHB [1]. As such, we believe the additional security
burden imposed by heartbeats to be minimal and manage-
able, especially in relation to their potential benefit.
5.3 Deployment and Incentives
IHBs help support global measurement and promote a bet-
ter understanding of the network, and we sketched several
motivating examples of how they might be leveraged. Here
we envision possible incentives and paths to deployment.
DNS servers: As an initial step toward global deployment,
we target DNS servers as ideal candidates to source IHBs
for several reasons. First, DNS roots, authorities, and pub-
lic resolvers are well-known infrastructure that is globally
distributed, continually alive, and well-connected. Second,
users depend on these servers as critical infrastructure. Thus,
both users and providers have a vested interest in understand-
ing, optimizing, and debugging the availability and perfor-
mance of DNS connectivity.
End-users: Second, we believe IHBs can provide direct ben-
efit to participating users as described in §4.2. While the ben-
efit increases in proportion to the number of participants for
IHBs, deployment can be bootstrapped with DNS servers,
while end-users can benefit from LHBs immediately as de-
ployment progresses. We envision IHB support within home
routers and CPE to be critical for widespread adoption and
plan to implement a prototype that can run on OpenWRT as
a first step toward understanding how users can benefit.
5.4 IPv6
Heartbeats may be especially important in IPv6 where the
size of the 128-bit address space poses unique measurement
obstacles. For instance, whereas exhaustive vulnerability,
census, and topology scanning, e.g., [18, 6], are infeasible in
IPv6, an IPv6 IHB can naturally illuminate active hosts, net-
works, and paths. However, the sparsity of the IPv6 address
space implies that choosing the heartbeat target (destination
IPv6 address) at random will rarely produce an active host,
much less a routed network.
With only 0.002% of the IPv6 address space advertised
currently [24], only approximately one in every 50K ran-
dom heartbeats will be directed toward an advertised IPv6
prefix. While randomly destined IPv6 heartbeats will be ob-
served at darknets, the probability of reaching an active IPv6
host is vanishingly small (as small as O(2−64) in the case
of privacy preserving addresses [32]). We therefore advo-
cate for a reserved /64 destination address suffix for IHB. In
this way, network borders and telescopes can readily iden-
tify IPv6 IHB traffic, or special end-network routing may be
installed for IHBs. Further, it may be possible to develop
mechanisms that allow all IPv6 IHB nodes on a network
segment to receive the heartbeats, for instance via a special
MAC address mapping or rewriting IHB packets into link-
local IPv6 multicast.
Further enhancements may be possible to bias IPv6 IHBs
to active and routed portions of the address space. For in-
stance, we observe that received heartbeats can be used to
discover and learn the active address space. For example, the
/64 network corresponding to the source address of received
heartbeats is certain to be routed, and clustering of contigu-
ous /64s can produce larger prefixes. IPv6 hosts participating
in the IHB can bias their probing to these learned blocks to
better utilize the probing budget. While this learning process
might seem to require significant time (and wasted probing),
we note that the control plane of routers participating in IHB
have direct and accurate knowledge of the routed IPv6 ad-
dress space, and can effectively act as seeds to bootstrap the
learning process.
6. FUTURE WORK
Significant future work remains to realizing the IHB vi-
sion, and initial architectural choices may prove important.
For instance, the current design requires a non-trivial number
of IHBs before every node has touched every other node. In-
stead, a possible alternative is to coordinate heartbeats among
participating nodes on a network segment—e.g., via a local
gossip mechanism. In this way, nodes could divvy up the
random permutation to minimize coverage time.
Unlike more radical network architecture proposals, im-
plementing and experimenting with IHBs is readily possible,
and we have begun just this. While IHBs could be placed
into the network stack of operating systems, our approach
is to develop a user-space program, heartbeatd, that im-
plements IHB. We plan a small-scale deployment to perform
long-term continual heartbeats. Simultaneously, we plan to
explore the real-world inferences possible at a variety of ob-
servation points, including at individual nodes, a network
border, CPE, and on a darknet.
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